The dramatic welfare reforms of 1996 affected public assistance usage patterns, possibly leading to more cycling on and off welfare as opposed to long-term continuous participation. We examine 128,775 Tennessee families that left welfare between October 1996 and April 2001. Of these, about one-third returned to the program at least once during this period. We provide statistical portraits of these families and compare reentrants with those who remained off public assistance. We conclude with a multivariate analysis of the determinants of reentry. Results suggest that families with younger, female, or black caretakers and those with more children are more likely to return. Those less likely to return include families whose caretakers were married or who had more education or were not working as of case closure.
Introduction
It is well known that the U.S. welfare system underwent a dramatic transformation in 1996. Time limits were placed on benefit receipt, work requirements were instituted, and an array of supportive services was made available to program participants. With these changes in policy, it becomes even more important that we understand the dynamics of welfare participation. Welfare reentry, defined here as a return to public assistance rolls after leaving the program for at least two months, is of continuing concern to policy makers and researchers alike.
Although the occurrence of reentry is certainly not new, the implementation of stricter policy requirements in the 1996 law have once again put it at the forefront of welfare research.
Reentry occurs for many different reasons, typically depending on the circumstances of each individual case. Possible causes of reentry include changes in household composition, marital status, or employment status. The addition of a child, either through birth or adoption, might require higher support levels that may only be accessible through a return to the welfare program. A divorce, separation, or death of a spouse can also make it difficult for the surviving spouse to maintain self-sufficiency, thereby causing a return to welfare. Changes in earnings resulting from a loss of a job or a reduction in hours can also increase the attractiveness of returning to welfare. These are just a few of the possible causes of reentry. The possibilities are as numerous as the incidences of reentry.
Reentry is frequently viewed negatively by policy makers and researchers. This is evidenced by the popular use of the word "recidivism" to denote a return to program rolls. As this term typically refers to repeat criminal offenders, we opt for the more optimistic "reentry."
With this, it is important to consider both the negative and positive aspects of reentry.
A return to welfare is often perceived as a signal of instability, suggesting that the recipient is unable to maintain self-sufficiency for any lengthy period of time. Families who are more reliant on public assistance have a much more difficult time trying to leave the program permanently. A return to the welfare program may result from the inability of the household head, or caretaker, to keep a steady job. This unemployment can be detrimental to the well being of the family due to lost earnings, valuable work experience, and on-the-job-training. A loss of experience and job skills while unemployed also makes future employment more difficult for the caretaker to obtain. Reentry is also viewed negatively by program officials because the process of closing and subsequently reopening cases (after reestablishing eligibility) places a burden on case workers. This is an especially important issue in light of recent state budget shortfalls.
Despite its negative perceptions to date, reentry may not necessarily be a bad event.
Viewed in a more positive light, continual reentry shows that a recipient is making a good faith effort to leave the program. The family may just need a bit more support before it can become completely self-sufficient. A temporary return to the welfare program might provide the needed help to attain permanent self-sufficiency. Finally, reentry may only represent a brief reliance on public assistance. If a household were to experience a temporary job loss or a reduction in earned income or hours worked, it may become necessary to return to the welfare program. The return spell may not last very long and may play an important role in helping the family to regain self-sufficiency.
Additional empirical analysis of welfare reentry is warranted for a number of reasons.
First, it is useful for researchers and policy makers to understand the changing patterns of welfare use, especially since the 1996 reforms might have influenced welfare spell length and frequency. Second, if one goal of the changing policies is to reduce welfare dependency and promote self-sufficiency, it is critical to understand the forces behind welfare reentry. Empirical analysis can identify not only when reentry is most likely to occur, but also which types of former recipients are most likely to return to the rolls. With this information in hand, policy makers can direct post-program transition services more efficiently toward those with the greatest risk of reentry. Third, there is continuing interest among researchers and policy makers in examining the post-program experiences of former welfare participants, especially after the dramatic 1996 reforms. While the earlier literature has focused on such things as employment and earnings, we view reentry as a relatively under-studied but equally important outcome.
Our analysis is one of the first to focus on reentry after the 1996 reforms and one of a limited number that use administrative data. We proceed with a discussion of the potential effects of welfare reform on reentry rates and then move to a brief summary of prior studies of welfare reentry. Following a thorough description of the monthly administrative data from the state of Tennessee that is employed in our analysis, we present an in-depth discussion of various characteristics of welfare leavers and offer a comparison with the general caseload. This is important in enabling us to generalize our results to broader populations either within Tennessee or in other states. Detailed analyses of the characteristics of reentrants, overall reentry rates and reentry rates for various demographic groups are provided in the section that follows. All of this serves to motivate our multivariate analysis of the effects of a number of factors on reentry using a survival-time econometric model. The paper concludes with a summary and directions for future research.
Possible Effects of the 1996 Reforms on Reentry Rates
The implementation of time limits and other program requirements can certainly affect the rates of welfare exit and reentry. Recognition of time limits by participants will increase the frequency of welfare exit-and reentry-as individuals attempt to maximize their current and future well being. In order to improve their own welfare, individuals may choose to use benefits only when they are needed the most, which may imply cycling on and off the welfare program.
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Another important effect of the 1996 reforms on reentry involves the induced change in the general makeup of the welfare caseload. Lifetime time limits and work requirements might remove many of the long-term recipients from the rolls, thereby leading to an observed increase in reentry rates if the remaining participants are more likely to cycle on and off the program.
Alternatively, these new elements of welfare policy might remove mainly short-term recipients, leaving many of the long-term participants on the rolls. As such, reentry rates might fall as a result, simply due to the changing nature of the caseload. The net effect of the changing caseload on reentry is ambiguous.
It is important to keep in mind that the American economy performed remarkably well during the early years of the new welfare regime. The late 1990s were times of great prosperity for most families, and the observed reduction in welfare rolls is at least partially the result of a strong economy.
2 With that, caution should be exercised in attributing changes in reentry rates solely to policy changes.
Previous Studies of Welfare Reentry
To gain a perspective on the changes in reentry rates over time, it is useful to examine previous research on the topic. Of the existing studies of welfare reentry, few have used post-welfare-reform data. This is likely a result of difficulties in obtaining good data and the relatively short time period that the new laws have been in place. Nonetheless, the available studies are instructive and are summarized below.
As shown in Table 1 , the earlier literature on reentry reports that between 20 and 81 percent of individuals who end a spell on welfare return to the rolls at some point during their lifetime (or, more typically, during the period of analysis). Table 1 also provides a summary of one-year reentry rates found in the literature, along with a brief description of the sample used in each study. Despite the wide dispersion of eventual reentry rates, one area of consensus in the literature is that reentry occurs rapidly: 11 to 33 percent return within the first year alone. This suggests that the first few months off the program seem to be the most critical in determining which individuals will return to the rolls.
The wide variation in the percent of individuals who return can be explained almost entirely by the different sources of data used by various authors. Data that cover short time intervals tend to produce reentry rates that are lower than those that cover longer periods of time, due to their inability to observe individuals for a sufficient period of time following their welfare experience. Yearly data (e.g., Ellwood 1986) also tend to understate reentry due to a loss of variation in the month-to-month program status of individuals within a single year. The upperend estimates of reentry rates are found using samples of divorced women (Meyer 1993) or inner-city teenage mothers (Gleason, Rangarajan, and Schochet 1998) , both of which could be expected to exhibit higher reentry rates.
The reentry analysis by Spera and Born (1998) Other control variables were used, and many were found to have important effects on reentry, but no clear consensus developed across the various studies. Although the sample is fairly evenly split among the age categories, there are slightly more caretakers under the age of 25 in the sample than in any other category. The over-40 category has the lowest percentage of caretakers with only about 14 percent. This distribution for leavers is certainly not surprising since younger individuals are more likely to have children and difficulties in finding a job due to a lack of experience.
Construction of the Data Sample
Nearly half of our assistance groups consist of only two members, with the percentage falling as assistance group size increases. Only 6.6 percent of the assistance groups in our sample have more than four members. This sample is more heavily represented by two-and three-person assistance groups than the overall 1997 Families First caseload, primarily due to our removal of child-only cases from this analysis.
Roughly 39 percent of the assistance groups that left the program have a youngest child that is between one and four years of age at the time of closure, which may provide evidence that those with younger children are in fact exiting the program more frequently than others. Furthermore, work participation during benefit receipt can be an important indicator of future reentry probabilities.
In our sample of administrative data, reaching Tennessee's short-term time limit of 18 months is only responsible for 2.5 percent of the closures. The average number of accumulated countable lifetime months of benefits as of case closure is 4.8 months, suggesting that short-term stays on public assistance are more likely to be the norm than is continuous lifetime participation. In terms of work requirements, more than one-fourth of all caretakers were working at a job for pay as of their case closures, and nearly 40 percent were receiving some sort of earned income. These characteristics are investigated in more detail below.
Overall Reentry Rates and Characteristics of Reentrants
Of the 128,775 assistance groups in our sample who have left the Families First program at least once since the program's beginning, 42,283 experienced at least one return. The general reentry trends for this group are presented in Table 3 . The eventual cumulative reentry rate over
the time period that we analyze, as shown graphically in Figure 1 , was 32.8 percent. This Figure   also includes the cumulative reentry rates as of two, three, and four years after program exit.
Reading from Table 3 , about 13.6 percent returned within six months and 22 percent returned within one year of leaving. This is remarkably close to the one-year reentry rate found in the post-reform study of reentry by Spera and Born (1998) , as shown in Table 1 . These findings suggest that most of the eventual reentry occurs relatively soon after an exit. The Tennessee evidence apparently mirrors broader studies summarized above.
Changes that may have occurred in the assistance group's size, income, or residency may provide some indication of why reentry is observed. Unlike those who leave and do not reenter, reentrants to Families First provide a complete set of information in the administrative data upon their return. Consequently, we are able to examine changes in various characteristics for those who return, but not for those who remain off the program. While this provides some useful descriptive evidence, we have no way of comparing the effects of any changes in characteristics on reentry rates without a similar set of information for leavers.
We begin the profile of reentrants with a discussion of the assistance group's income from various sources. 10 If an assistance group's monthly income were to fall during an offprogram spell, a return to welfare would be more likely. Table 4 provides means and standard deviations for income variables at the time of the initial case closure for the entire population of leavers, for reentrants, and for those who remain off the program (non-reentrants).
Surprisingly, average earned income for those who eventually reenter was considerably higher than for those who remain off the program. 11 The mean value of unearned income was slightly higher for non-reentrants than it was for reentrants. This may suggest that those who left the program with higher levels of unearned income were better able to remain off the program as a result of more stable or ongoing non-work support structures. The mean of the current cash benefit amount at closure was higher for non-reentrants, presumably because their earned incomes were lower. 12 In the absence of the income data, this could be somewhat unexpected since intuition might suggest that a higher benefit level would make welfare a more attractive option to potential recipients. However, this analysis is unable to project whether the recipient's benefit level would remain the same from one spell to another. It is quite possible that those who did not eventually reenter experienced growth in other income areas that limited their benefit eligibility and therefore made returning to welfare a less attractive option. percent of reentrants returned to the program at a lower cash benefit level.
Of those assistance groups who returned to the program, approximately one-half experienced changes in the number of recipients during the off-program spell. As shown in Table 5 . For those who changed marital status, the most likely move was from married to separated. This transition accounted for nearly 22.8 percent of those whose marital status changed. Other frequent options were separated to divorced (18.1 percent), separated to married (9.8 percent), and single to married (9.5 percent).
Slightly less than 7 percent became divorced after having been married at closure, and a similar share changed from divorced to married. In total, less than three percent of all reentrants were unmarried upon exit but married upon reentry. Table 6 shows cumulative reentry rates for samples in various categories. Of course, it bears mentioning that the results in this section are only meant to be illustrative. These simple calculations can help us understand the various causes of reentry, but they cannot independently identify the true effects of each characteristic on the probability of reentry holding all other factors constant. Such an analysis is possible, however, and is presented below.
Demographic Breakdowns of Reentry Rates
As indicated by previous studies, age can have an effect on the probability of reentry.
Assistance groups whose caretaker is younger than 25 are most likely to experience a return.
Younger caretakers are more likely to have younger children, a possibility that is explored below. They may also have less job experience and training that may prevent them from obtaining a job that pays sufficient earnings. Without sufficient monthly income a return to welfare becomes more likely.
necessary variable to include in any analysis of reentry. 13 An assistance group is limited to 60 months of lifetime benefits and becomes ineligible once the youngest child reaches the age of 18.
Assistance groups with younger youngest children may be more likely to cycle on and off
Families First, given that they have longer time horizons over which benefits might be necessary. 14 This theory would also suggest assistance groups with younger youngest children would also be expected to exit the program more frequently than other groups in order to conserve benefit eligibility. Table 6 reveals this tendency, as assistance groups whose youngest child is between the ages of one and four are most likely to return.
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Residence in an urban area might also have an impact on the probability that an assistance group will return to Families First. As shown in the table, those in urban areas are more likely to reenter than are those in rural areas. Despite the perceived availability of jobs and important services such as child care in an urban environment, urban residents are more likely to return for a variety of reasons. For example, urban residents probably live closer to a TDHS office than residents of more rural areas. Further, one can receive Families First benefits in greater anonymity in an urban setting; welfare receipt in a smaller town is potentially more difficult to conceal. Yet another explanation is that public assistance might be seen as a more acceptable alternative in an urban environment.
If cases that are closed due to time limits are the least able, ready, or willing to leave
Families First on their own, then we might expect them to have higher reentry rates. Table 6 reveals this, as time limit closures are much more likely to result in reentry than other closures.
Further, most of this reentry occurs quite rapidly. Tennessee's policy requires three months of ineligibility following a time limit closure before a second spell may begin, so it appears that many of those who meet the 18-month time limit return very soon after being removed from the rolls.
Caretakers who are single as of their case closure are the most likely to return to Families First following an exit. Divorced or separated caretakers are more likely to return than married or widowed caretakers, suggesting that marriage can be a key route to self-sufficiency for former program participants. A contributing explanation is that there are more stringent eligibility rules for married assistance groups, making reentry a less probable outcome.
The larger the number of recipients in the assistance group, the more likely the group is to return to the rolls. Self-sufficiency for assistance groups of larger sizes is certainly more difficult to maintain than it is for smaller groups. Unsurprisingly, caretakers with more education are less likely to reenter Families First. Those with less education are apparently less able to find permanent employment or other means of achieving financial security following a program exit.
Perhaps more surprisingly, caretakers who were working at a job for pay at the time of their case closure are more likely to return to the program. This finding suggests that work is a less permanent means than marriage of achieving self-sufficiency. An alternative explanation is that non-workers may be more likely to qualify for Supplemental Security Income or other programs, making reentry to Families First less necessary.
As a final preliminary look at the demographics of reentry, Table 6 shows that assistance groups with black caretakers are more likely to experience a return to welfare than other groups. Again, it is not possible in these pair-wise analyses to discern whether this is truly an ethnic effect, or whether black assistance groups tend to have other characteristics (such as urban residence or larger assistance groups) that make them more likely to reenter. With this, we turn to a more in-depth statistical analysis of the causes of reentry that allows us to assess each characteristic's independent effect on reentry rates.
Multivariate Analysis of the Determinants of Reentry
A variety of econometric methods are available for examining time-duration data.
Among the most common are various forms of proportional hazards models, which estimate the effects of various factors on the probability that a spell will end at some point in time, given that it has not previously ended. Denoting T as the individual's off-program spell length and t as the current time, this probability is as follows:
where ∆ represents a small increment of time.
The limit of [P( t ≤ T ≤ t + ∆ | T ≥ t )]/ ∆ as ∆
goes to zero is known as the hazard rate. It is typically assumed that T has a continuous probability distribution function, given by f(t), where the associated cumulative distribution function is
We are interested in the probability that a spell lasts at least as long as some length t, which is given by the survival (or survivor) function:
The hazard rate λ(t) is the rate at which spells are completed immediately after t, given that they have lasted at least until t, and is related to the survival function as shown in equation (2).
Empirically, hazard models express the hazard rate as a multiplicative function of some baseline hazard, λ 0 (t), and an exponential function of a set of covariates:
where β represents the usual vector of coefficients. Estimation of this type of model involves making a decision about the functional form, if any, of the baseline hazard.
A direct extension of the proportional hazards specification above is the accelerated failure time (AFT) metric, which is this paper's chosen estimation method. Begin by defining τ i as follows:
With some manipulation and rearranging, the log of the failure time t can then be conveniently expressed as a linear function of a set of relevant covariates:
The natural log of τ i represents something of an error term in equation (5), the distribution of which determines the particular model in much the same way as the choice of functional form for the baseline hazard in the proportional hazards metric.
The selection of an appropriate distribution for the baseline hazard (or τ i in the AFT metric) is typically based on an examination of the empirical hazard exhibited by the data in question. 16 The relatively smooth empirical hazard exhibited by our data, which is characterized by high initial hazard rates followed by gradually declining rates, indicates that the generalized gamma distribution is most appropriate. We examine alternative distributions below.
Fortunately, the generalized gamma model includes a number of alternative distributions (namely, the more popular but less general Weibull, exponential, and log-normal) as special cases. Econometric results provide the necessary information for testing the appropriateness of these alternatives, and Akaike's (1974) Information Criterion can also be used to select an appropriate functional form. While we were able to reject all three of these alternatives in favor of the generalized gamma model, we explore their results in the discussion below.
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In sum, this general empirical approach is similar to regression analysis in that it allows us to gauge the impact of each characteristic on reentry, holding all other factors constant. 18 In addition to the characteristics discussed in the preceding analysis, we include identifiers for the eight TDHS districts as controls for local labor market conditions, administrative practices, or other regional idiosyncrasies that may affect reentry probabilities. 19 The possibility remains that our set of covariates, while extensive, might not account for some of the factors that might influence reentry. We return to this in our examination of remaining unobserved heterogeneity below. It should also be noted that, by definition, off-program spells never end unless an individual reenters the welfare system. Consequently, all non-reentering off-program spells in our data are right-censored at the end of our analysis period. Our estimation method controls for this, as described in detail by Cleves, Gould, and Gutierrez (2002) . 
Results and Discussion
Results, which have been transformed into time ratios, are presented in Table 7 . The time ratio coefficients indicate the effect of one-unit increases in each covariate on the length of offprogram spell, all else equal. To be precise, time ratios that are greater than one indicate that an increase in the variable in question leads to an increase in time off the program (or a delay in the probability of reentry), all else constant. Similarly, time ratios that are less than one indicate that increases in those variables speed up the probability of reentry. For example, the estimate for the caretaker's age (1.033) tells us that the probability of reentry falls as the caretaker gets older, as shown by Meyer (1993) , Brandon (1995) , Harris (1996) , Gleason, Rangarajan, and Schochet (1998), and Hoynes (2000) . Specifically, an additional year of age increases time off the program by about 3.3 percent. This mirrors our earlier finding, but is a stronger conclusion since all of the other factors in the model are being held constant.
The other results in Table 7 largely echo our earlier findings. Assistance groups with male caretakers are less likely to return as assistance groups with female caretakers. Echoing all but a few of the earlier empirical studies, we find that blacks are much more likely than whites to return, all else equal (i.e., their time off the program is only about 62.8 percent as long).
Members of other non-white groups are less likely than whites to return. An additional child (or other assistance group member) increases the probability of reentry, again as found in virtually all of the prior studies surveyed above. Earned income, unearned income and the amount of the Families First benefit as of closure have either very small or imprecise effects.
Contrary to earlier findings (Ellwood 1986 , Meyer 1993 , and Hoynes 2000 , we find that assistance groups with younger youngest children are always less likely to reenter relative to those whose youngest child is 13 or older. Further, the effect of the oldest included category (9 to 12 years) is not measured with statistical precision. These results almost certainly stem from Tennessee's transitional benefits program, which provides up to 18 months of child care assistance for families with children who are either under age 13 or disabled after they leave the welfare rolls. Additional child care assistance is typically available after those 18 months as long as program funds are available. Consequently, leavers with young children might be less likely to reenter, simply because they can continue to receive child care assistance for an extended period of time while off the program.
Divorced, separated, and single caretakers are more likely to reenter than are married caretakers. Those with less than a high school education are more likely to reenter than are those with a high school education, while having some education beyond high school reduces the probability of reentry. The general theme that more education reduces reentry follows much of the earlier empirical literature.
A few of the TDHS district identifiers are statistically significant, suggesting that local labor markets, administrative practices, or other regional factors are important in the reentry process. Surprisingly, the likelihood of reentry falls when the local unemployment rate rises.
This contradicts Hoynes (2000) , the only prior study to consider local labor markets in detail.
We suspect that this might be at least partially driven by Tennessee's time limit policy, which permits an immediate extension if a recipient's county unemployment rate is more than twice the state average. In this case, program participants in high-unemployment counties might be less likely to leave the program in the first place.
The final three factors in Table 7 provide some interesting detail regarding important program characteristics. First, all else equal, welfare recipients who leave as a result of reaching a time limit are significantly more likely to return than those who leave for other reasons. Those who have accumulated more lifetime months of benefits are also more likely to reenter, suggesting a more permanent attachment to the welfare system. Finally, those who were working at a job for pay upon leaving are more likely to reenter than are non-workers.
We performed a number of checks to assess the robustness of the general findings in Table 7 . First, we augmented the model to account for unobservable heterogeneity, given that we are not able to adequately measure all of the determinants of welfare reentry. Empirically, this amounts to the inclusion of a multiplicative individual-specific factor, the distribution of which must be assumed by the researcher. Allowing for either gamma or inverse-Gaussian heterogeneity-the two most common distributions for considering unobserved heterogeneity in survival-time models-had virtually no effect on our baseline results. Furthermore, likelihood ratio tests for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, which compare models with and without controls for it, universally failed to reject the null of no heterogeneity for all generalized gamma models. 21 This suggests either that the generalized gamma model correctly identifies the baseline hazard function, or that our set of explanatory variables is sufficiently inclusive.
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To investigate this further, we experimented with a number of alternative distributions for the survival-time model as discussed above. Specifically, we examined Weibull, exponential, and log-normal models (all special cases of the generalized gamma model) in addition to a loglogistic model. Wald tests of the ancillary parameters generated by the generalized gamma model and a comparison of Akaike's (1974) Information Criterion values for all models led us to prefer the generalized gamma model over all alternatives. 23 Nonetheless, results were very similar across models. Results without heterogeneity controls were somewhat different in some cases, but were essentially identical to our baseline results in terms of signs, magnitudes, and significance when heterogeneity controls (using either the gamma or inverse-Gaussian distribution) were implemented. Also, contrary to our baseline generalized gamma model, tests for unobserved heterogeneity rejected the null of no heterogeneity for all alternative models.
This reveals the interesting possibility that controlling for unobserved heterogeneity is even more critical when the underlying hazard has been misspecified. In the end, though, our results are remarkably robust to alternative distributional assumptions when we allow for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity.
The next check on our baseline findings was motivated by the fact that our inclusion of indicators for education cost us a rather substantial decrease in sample size due to an absence of data during the earliest months of the program. To investigate the importance of this loss in sample size, we dropped the education variables and estimating the trimmed model on a larger, more time-inclusive sample. Interestingly, the results from this exercise were virtually identical to those in our baseline model. Finally, we substituted our TDHS District identifiers with indicators of the assistance group's Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) of residence (if any) and estimated the model both with and without the education indicators. This was intended to
give the regional controls more of an urban-rural definition. 24 Again, the general conclusions discussed above continued to hold without exception.
Conclusions, Caveats, and Areas for Future Research
The Tennessee experience with welfare reentry has been similar in many ways to earlier findings. About one-third of those who leave Families First eventually return, and most of that reentry occurs fairly quickly. A comparison of these findings with the earlier literature suggests that the dramatic policy changes during the mid-1990s might not have had a substantial impact on welfare reentry. Our research also reveals a number of characteristics which appear to be correlated with reentry. Specifically, age, gender, ethnicity, and assistance-group size all exert important effects on reentry rates. Assistance groups with younger, black, or female caretakers and those with more children are most likely to reenter. Those with married caretakers, those whose caretakers have more education, and those whose caretakers were not participating in work activities as of their initial case closure are less likely to return. In terms of policy, families who left the program as a result of meeting a time limit or who had accumulated more months of program participation upon exit were more likely to return.
Because this study provides some of the first findings that use post-reform administrative data, a number of questions remain unanswered. First, as noted above, the economy performed remarkably well during most of our period of analysis. Reentry rates may have changed given recent economic fluctuations, although the direction and magnitude of any change is not clear. 8 See Grogger and Michalopoulos (1999) or Grogger (2000) for additional discussion on how the age of the youngest child might affect the reentry decision when assistance groups are subject to time limits.
9 These counties, which define our indicator for urban residence, contain the cities of Nashville, Chattanooga, Knoxville, and Memphis, respectively. is available from the authors upon request.
11 As our analysis includes all Families First leavers, all differences are statistically significant.
12 In Tennessee as in most other states, the cash benefit amount typically falls as income rises.
13 Again, for additional discussion, see Michalopoulos (1999) or Grogger (2000) .
14 Of course, having an additional child could increase the potential time horizon over which benefits might be needed by families with older youngest children. 15 We are only able to observe the age of the youngest child beginning in July of 1997, and thus do not have a long enough history to calculate 48 or 55 month reentry rates for these groups. Similar data issues preclude the calculation of long-term reentry rates by assistance group size, marital status, education, and work status.
represent an improvement over our parametric approach, our analysis of near-population data gives us confidence that any problems of inconsistency in our estimates are minor. Also, Meyer points out that coefficients on timevarying covariates-of which we have none-are more likely to be biased than those on time-invariant covariates in the case of a misspecified baseline hazard. Finally, our data exhibit a very smooth underlying hazard, which dramatically increases our chances of properly specifying a parametric approach.
17 All survival-time models in this paper were estimated with the Stata (version 8) statistical software, which permits the researcher to consider a multitude of distributional assumptions as well as the usual controls for censored data and unobserved heterogeneity. For additional information on these and other methods, interested readers should consult Cleves, Gould, and Gutierrez (2002) , Gutierrez (2002) , Greene (2000) , or Kiefer (1988) .
In other words, we would be assuming that all of the included variables do not change over time when in fact they often do. Second, our chosen econometric approach models the natural log of the off-program spell length (not the discrete probability of returning to welfare) as a function of an array of explanatory variables. It can be thought of in simplest terms as a more elaborate regression model where the log of time is the dependent variable. It is therefore inappropriate to include dummies for duration length in the model. When we attempted to control for duration effects by inserting a series of dummies for actual spell lengths, the augmented model failed to converge after 115 iterations. Our approach, which specifies the underlying baseline hazard using a generalized gamma distribution, controls for the fact that the underlying probability of reentry changes over time. 21 The likelihood ratio test statistics were indistinguishable from zero for both the gamma and inverse-Gaussian distributions (with p-values near unity), leading us to strongly reject the presence of unobserved heterogeneity in the generalized gamma model. 22 Full results for all robustness checks are available from the authors upon request. See Gutierrez (2002) Criterion (AIC) is defined as {-2(log-likelihood) + 2(c+p+1)}, where c is the number of model covariates and p is the number of model-specific ancillary parameters. The preferred model-the one with the lowest AIC value-is the generalized gamma model regardless of the presence of controls for unobserved heterogeneity. 24 As noted above, TDHS District identifiers allow the counties that contain the cities of Chattanooga, Knoxville, Memphis, and Nashville to have a unique identifier, while the remaining counties are divided into four other districts. Our alternative specification identifies these urban areas more broadly as MSAs, and also includes indicators for the Jacksonville, Clarksville-Hopkinsville, and Johnson City-Bristol-Kingsport MSAs. 
